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The Effect of Interest Rate 
Options Hedging on
Term-Structure Dynamics
esearch has shown that the yield curve is a reasonably good
  predictor of economic activity, in part because it seems to 
reflect expectations of future economic fundamentals such as 
growth and inflation.1 Accordingly, movements in the curve in 
response to economic and financial shocks are typically watched 
closely by market participants and policymakers. However, 
several recent episodes of market illiquidity, most notably the 
crisis in the fall of 1998, have shown that disruptions to liquidity 
can affect the short-term dynamics of interest rates and the shape 
of the curve independently of fundamentals.
In this article, we study the influence of market liquidity and 
dynamic trading strategies on the short-run dynamics of the 
yield curve. Specifically, we focus on the recent behavior of 
intermediate-maturity interest rates for evidence of market 
liquidity effects arising from the hedging of interest rate 
options. We base our approach in large part on the hypothesis 
that the hedging transactions of interest rate options dealers 
generate systematic trading flows in the underlying fixed-
income markets following a shock to interest rates.
In the interest rate options market, dealers are net writers of 
options, and they manage or hedge their options exposures by 
taking offsetting positions in fixed-income instruments such as 
U.S. Treasury securities and Eurodollar futures contracts. As 
interest rates change, the dealers must buy or sell fixed-income 
securities to adjust these hedge positions. Consequently, in the 
aggregate, these hedging transactions can potentially affect the 
market prices of the hedging instruments themselves, thus 
leading to further changes in interest rates. Although the size 
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• Beginning in the 1990s, the short-term 
dynamics of the yield curve changed in ways 
that appear to be related to the growth of 
the interest rate options market. 
• When interest rates change, options dealers 
buy or sell securities to adjust the hedging 
positions that they have taken to offset their 
options exposures. Since the early 1990s, 
these trades have been, in aggregate, large 
enough to affect market liquidity. 
• The net result of this trading activity can be to 
push interest rates further in the direction they 
were moving. Such “feedback” effects can 
alter the shape of the yield curve, especially 
when changes in interest rates are large.
• For this reason, analysts should use caution 
in interpreting short-run movements in the 
yield curve as signals of future economic 
developments.
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of these hedging transactions in Treasuries and Eurodollar 
futures is usually relatively small, the transactions’ systematic 
relationship to changes in interest rates suggests that they may 
still produce small but observable feedback patterns in the 
short-run movements of interest rates.
Our study reveals that the short-run dynamics in the 
intermediate maturities of the yield curve changed around 1990, 
with the appearance of positive feedback in weekly interest rate 
changes. For example, we find that after 1990, if the yield curve 
“bows” up at the five-year maturity, five-year interest rates are 
likely to rise further in subsequent weeks. The observed positive 
feedback is consistent with the effects of options dealers’ hedging 
activity, and, notably, it is found only in the 1990s, after the 
market for interest rate options grew to a significant size. We also 
provide evidence indicating that the speed at which feedback 
effects move through the yield curve has increased in recent 
years. Not surprisingly, the market liquidity/positive-feedback 
effects are concentrated in the weeks following the largest 
changes in interest rates, but they are virtually nonexistent 
during periods of small changes in interest rates.
Our results also suggest that very short-run movements in the 
yield curve should be interpreted with caution, because such 
movements may reflect liquidity effects as well as changes in 
economic fundamentals. Moreover, we find that liquidity effects 
are likely to be larger when interest rate changes are large and thus 
when policymakers and market participants are most interested in 
monitoring yield curve movements closely. Reassuringly, the 
liquidity effects uncovered in this article are not long-lasting, 
suggesting that interpretation of yield curve movements over 
longer periods of time should not be affected by our findings.
Our analysis begins with a discussion of the role of liquidity risk 
and positive feedback in the short-run behavior of asset prices. We 
then consider how the hedging of interest rate options could 
produce liquidity effects in the medium-term segment of the yield 
curve, where market survey data suggest that dynamic hedging of 
options could have the largest impact on transaction flows and 
thus on market liquidity. Next, we test for evidence of liquidity 
effects at a weekly frequency in both the Treasury and swap 
(Eurodollar) yield curves. We conclude by considering our study’s 
implications for risk management and policy.
Liquidity Risk and Positive Feedback
Market liquidity risk is the price risk associated with executing 
large transactions or executing transactions quickly. The risk is 
manifested in a sharp movement of prices against a trader 
when making a large purchase or sale of a security, or, in an 
extreme case, when a trader is unable to execute a large trade at 
a reasonable price.2 Thus, market liquidity refers to the degree 
to which transaction flows affect asset prices in a market 
separately from any change in the economic fundamentals that 
determine asset values.
The potential for liquidity risk to affect asset prices in ways 
that are distinct from the role of fundamental economic and 
financial variables is receiving more attention from economists 
and policymakers. In a recent paper, Longstaff (2001) describes 
how liquidity-constrained traders will make investment 
decisions that lead to illiquidity discounts in asset prices. The 
increasing role of tradable securities in the intermediation of 
risk and the allocation of capital is also drawing more attention 
to the determinants and dynamics of market liquidity. Two 
recent Bank for International Settlements reports (1999a, b) 
address the importance of market liquidity in the conduct of 
monetary policy and highlight the role of market liquidity in 
the financial market disruptions in the fall of 1998.
Related literature examines the potential for positive-
feedback trading to lead to sharp changes in or overshooting of 
asset prices. Positive-feedback traders who buy when prices rise 
and sell when prices fall have the potential to drive prices 
further in the same direction as the initial shock. Such trades 
occur in the presence of stop-loss risk management strategies, 
in the hedging of options, and as part of momentum trading 
strategies. Papers by Grossman (1988), DeLong et al. (1990), and 
Gennotte and Leland (1990) after the stock market crash of 1987 
describe how positive feedback in asset prices can emerge and be 
self-sustaining, despite the presence of rational traders who 
might otherwise link market prices to the fundamentals. 
Although these papers have demonstrated how positive feedback 
can occur, until now little systematic evidence has been found.3
The growth of the interest rate options market to significant 
size by the early 1990s provides us with a naturally occurring 
experiment to test for liquidity effects in the yield curve. The 
over-the-counter interest rate options market grew from 
$10 billion of outstanding contracts in 1986 to $561 billion 
in 1990 and to $3,704 billion in 1995.4 If the options market 
affects market liquidity in the underlying fixed-income 
markets, then we may be able to find differences in the behavior 
of interest rates before and after 1990.
The growth of the interest rate options 
market to significant size by the early 
1990s provides us with a naturally 
occurring experiment to test for liquidity 
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As interest rate options became widely available, they 
allowed market participants who had passively borne interest 
rate volatility risk to trade and transfer this risk to someone 
else. In practice, the “someone else” has proved to be the 
trading units of large financial intermediaries that acquire 
exposure to interest rate volatility by selling interest rate 
options to their customers and are more likely to hedge and 
manage volatility risk than to bear it passively. The nonlinear 
nature of an options exposure requires that its hedge position 
be adjusted as interest rates change. Thus, options dealers are 
exposed to market liquidity risk when executing the trades 
required by the these hedge adjustments. Furthermore, because 
dealers are generally net writers of options, they will execute 
similar hedge-related trades when rates change. The systematic 
relationship of such trades to interest rate changes presents us 
with an opportunity to look for signs of their impact on market 
liquidity in the short-run behavior of interest rates. In our 
analysis, we look for changes in the dynamics of interest rates 
around 1990 that are consistent with the predicted market 
impact of the dealers’ options hedging in the aggregate. (More 
detailed information on interest rate options and how they are 
hedged can be found in the box.)
Interest Rate Options and Their Hedging
Over-the-Counter Interest Rate Options
Most over-the-counter interest rate options are caps and floors 
on the level of interest rates; the remainder are swaptions, which 
are options on swaps contracts. In International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association market surveys from the mid-1990s, 
caps and floors amounted to more than 80 percent of outstanding 
contracts, while swaptions accounted for the rest.
Caps and floors are options on future short-term interest rates, 
usually six-month Eurodollar rates. In an interest rate cap (floor) 
contract, the buyer receives the difference between the market 
interest rate and a strike rate specified in the options contract when 
the market rate is above (below) the strike rate, and nothing 
otherwise. Most cap and floor contracts are written for several 
years, and thus they can be thought of as a string of call (put) 
options on future values of Eurodollar rates over the contract 
period. A dealer’s portfolio of caps (floors) can therefore be 
thought of as a book of call (put) options on all six-month forward 
interest rates along the entire yield curve (out to the maturity of the 
longest maturity contract, which can be as long as ten years).
A forward interest rate is the interest rate for a future time 
period as implied by the current shape of the yield curve. For 
example, the three-to-five-year forward rate is the two-year 
interest rate for the period between three to five years in the future. 
In particular, it is the rate agreed to today for a two-year loan 
commencing three years in the future. In the case of the forward 
Treasury rate, it can be calculated directly from the current three- 
and five-year Treasury rates.
In practice, dealers do not manage their options books by 
directly hedging every single six-month forward interest rate 
exposure along the entire yield curve out to ten years. For maturi-
ties beyond two or three years, they hedge longer sections of the 
yield curve in blocks broken at those points where the markets in 
the underlying securities are most liquid. For example, an options 
dealer might hedge all of the six-month forward rates of between 
three and five years in terms of a single exposure to the three-to-
five-year forward interest rate. Similarly, all six-month forward 
rates of between five and ten years would be hedged in terms 
of a single exposure to the five-to-ten-year forward interest rate.
Dynamic Hedging of Options
Generally speaking, an option can be hedged by taking an offsetting 
position in the underlying asset, and the required size of this position 
varies with the price of the underlying asset. This variability of the 
hedge position results from the varying sensitivity of the option’s 
value to the price of the underlying asset as its price changes. When 
the underlying asset price rises by a certain amount, a call option’s 
value will increase by a smaller amount because of the possibility that 
the price of the underlying asset could still reverse direction by the 
time the contract matures, and even fall below the strike price, 
rendering the option worthless. As the underlying asset’s price rises 
further, however, this prospect of a worthless outcome becomes less 
likely, and the option’s value becomes more responsive to changes in 
the underlying asset’s price.
This change in the price sensitivity of the option affects the size 
of the position in the underlying asset required to hedge the 
option. To compensate for the increase in the option’s price 
sensitivity as the underlying asset price rises, the hedge position in 
the underlying asset must be made larger as well. Conversely, as the 
asset price falls, the hedge position should shrink. This adjustment 
of the hedge position’s size as the underlying asset price changes is 
called dynamic hedging. Such adjustments involve buying the 
underlying security after its price has gone up and selling it after the 
price has fallen. This pattern of buying and selling introduces the 
potential for positive feedback in asset prices, as the transactions 
could introduce further upward (downward) pressure on prices 
after an initial upward (downward) shock to asset prices. See Hull 
(1993) for additional information on the pricing and hedging of 
interest rate options.
Example of a Bond Market Hedge of an Interest Rate Cap
The hedge of an interest rate cap involves a combination of long 
and short positions in fixed-income securities. A long position is a 
bond purchased with borrowed funds, while a short position is 
established by borrowing the bond and then selling it. The long 
position is closed out, or extinguished, by selling the bond and 
returning the borrowed funds, and the short position is closed out 54 The Effect of Interest Rate Options Hedging
Implications of the Dynamic
Hedging of Interest Rate Options
The 1995 central bank survey of the over-the-counter derivatives 
markets (Bank for International Settlements 1996)—the first 
detailed look at the structure of the markets—found that dealers 
had sold 50 percent more U.S. dollar interest rate options to 
customers than they had purchased. More recent data confirm 
that this asymmetry has persisted over time. This imbalance 
between end-user supply and demand is unique in the over-the-
counter derivatives markets.5 Generally speaking, options 
dealers do not leave themselves exposed to the interest rate risk 
in their net options positions; instead, they hedge this exposure 
by taking offsetting positions in other fixed-income securities. 
Indeed, the ability of dealers to trade in a broad range of fixed-
income markets probably allows them to execute hedging 
transactions faster and at a lower cost than other market 
participants, making them more willing than others to absorb 
the market’s net demand for interest rate options. Nevertheless, 
the dealers’ need to adjust hedge positions as interest rates 
by buying the bond and returning it to the bond’s lender. The long 
position gains value when the bond price rises, while the short 
position gains value when the bond price falls because the bond can 
be repurchased at a price lower than its initial sale price.
An interest rate cap exposure to a forward interest rate can be 
hedged with a combination of bonds whose maturities straddle the 
maturity of the forward rate. The hedge consists of a long position 
in a bond whose maturity equals the beginning date of the forward 
rate and a short position in a bond whose maturity equals the 
ending date of the forward rate.
In the case of a Treasury market hedge of an interest rate cap on 
the three-to-five-year forward rate, the hedge consists of a long 
position in a three-year Treasury note and a short position in a 
five-year note. This position in the two notes is exposed only to 
forward rates of between three and five years because the long and 
short note positions extinguish exposures to interest rates of up to 
three years’ maturity (see the table). In particular, the long position 
offsets the exposure of the short position to any interest rate that 
affects both notes—forward rates of three years’ maturity or less. 
Meanwhile, the hedge position is exposed to longer maturity 
interest rates, because although the three-year note is not exposed 
to forward rates beyond three years, the five-year note does have 
exposure to longer term rates (up to its five-year maturity). Thus, 
the net hedge position is a short position in the five-year note with 
exposure only to forward rates in years four and five.
What happens, then, when interest rates change? An increase in 
interest rates causes the value of the caps to rise, increasing the 
dealer’s exposure. (The dealer has sold caps.) At the same time, an 
increase in interest rates causes the prices of notes to fall. Thus, 
because the net hedge position is a short position in the five-year 
note (see the table), a fall in the value of the note due to an increase 
in rates will result in a gain in value of the short hedge position.a 
The overall effect is a rise in the value of the hedge position that 
offsets the increase in the dealer’s interest rate cap exposure.
Following the increase in interest rates, dealers will readjust 
their hedge positions. As noted earlier, at the higher interest rate 
levels, the interest rate cap becomes more sensitive to further rate 
changes than the initial hedge position does. Thus, to maintain an 
appropriate hedge, dealers will increase the size of their positions 
in the three- and five-year notes. It is this dynamic hedging 
behavior that can potentially affect the prices of fixed-income 
securities.
Net Exposure of Hedge Position to Interest Rates
Change in Present Value Due to an Increase
in Interest Rates
T i m e  ( y e a r s ) 12345
Forward rates F0,1 F1,2 F2,3 F3,4 F4,5
Impact of higher forward rates
  on short position in the
  five-year note (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Impact of higher forward rates
  on long position in the
  three-year note (-) (-) (-)
Net exposure to interest rates (+) (+)
Notes: A rise in interest rates will cause the present value of both the 
three- and five-year notes to fall. This fall in value, however, leads to a 
gain in the short position’s value because the note can be repurchased 
and returned to the security lender at a price lower than its initial sale 
price. The gains and losses from exposure to forward rates of up to 
three years’ maturity cancel each other, leaving only the short expo-
sure in the five-year note to forward rates in years four and five.
Interest Rate Options and Their Hedging (Continued)
aA short position is established by borrowing a security and selling it; 
the position is closed out by buying back the security at the prevailing 
market price and returning it to the lender. When the price of the 
security falls, the short position gains value because the bond can be 
purchased at a price lower than its original sale price.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2001 55
change means that their exposure to interest rate volatility risk is 
converted to an exposure to market liquidity risk when executing 
the trades required by their hedge adjustments.
For U.S. dollar interest rate options, the most liquid 
instruments for hedging are Eurodollar futures contracts and 
U.S. Treasury securities and futures (see box). Previous 
estimates of the total volume of interest rate options dealers’ 
hedging activity in the markets for these securities suggest that 
the hedging is likely to have the largest impact on market 
liquidity in the medium-term segment of the yield curve 
(Kambhu 1998). Although hedging activity is largest at the 
shortest maturities, the volume of hedging relative to turnover 
volume in Eurodollar futures is largest at the intermediate-
maturity segment of the yield curve (Table 1). If dealers hedge 
with Eurodollar futures contracts, a 25-basis-point rise in 
forward rates all along the yield curve would lead to hedging 
transactions amounting to twice the average daily turnover 
volume of futures contracts at maturities of between three and 
five years. The same 25-basis-point rise in forward rates could 
generate hedging transactions of about five times the daily 
turnover volume at maturities of five years and beyond.6
The potentially large hedging impact at three-to-ten-year 
maturities in the Eurodollar futures market suggests that dealers 
will also be hedging in other liquid markets, most likely in the 
U.S. Treasury market. If options dealers were hedging in these 
markets, a 25-basis-point increase in forward rates would cause 
a hedge adjustment amounting to 7 percent of the daily turnover 
in the Treasury futures and cash markets of five- and ten-year-
maturity securities (Kambhu 1998). A 75-basis-point increase in 
rates would cause hedge adjustments amounting to 21 percent of 
Treasury futures and cash turnover. Although these are not 
extraordinarily large shares of the Treasury market, they may be 
large enough to produce observable patterns in the behavior of 
the intermediate-maturity segment of the Treasury yield curve.7
At shorter maturities (less than three years), dealers’ 
hedging of interest rate options is less likely to affect market 
liquidity. The shorter maturity fixed-income markets have 
substantially larger turnover volume and greater liquidity, and 
thus dealers’ hedging activity can be easily accommodated. 
Therefore, we would not expect to find feedback effects at the 
short end of the yield curve.
Implications for Intermediate-Maturity 
Interest Rates
Our review of hedging activity thus far suggests that we look for 
market liquidity effects in the three-to-ten-year segment of the 
term structure. In particular, we will look at how the five-year 
spot rate reacts to past changes in the three-to-five-year 
forward rate and the five-to-ten-year forward rate. These 
maturities were chosen because data on three-, five-, and ten-
year Treasury rates are available for a relatively long time 
period and because the liquidity of these securities makes them 
attractive instruments for options hedging. We focus on the 
five-year spot rate and forward rates on either side of five years 
because the hedging of exposures to either of these forward 
rates will require trading in a five-year security (see box).
We formulate a testable hypothesis using the hedging of 
interest rate caps, because caps form the bulk of the over-the-
counter interest rate options market. As described in the box, 
the hedging of a three-to-five-year forward interest rate cap 
involves taking a short position in the five-year note (as well as 
a long position in the three-year note). This hedge position is 
adjusted dynamically as interest rates change because the 
option’s value increases at an escalating rate as forward rates 
rise. For example, a rise in the forward rate will require a larger 
short position in the five-year note. If many dealers attempt to 
sell short the five-year note at the same time, their actions could 
exert downward pressure on the price of the five-year Treasury 
note, translating into an increase in its yield.
For an interest rate cap on the five-to-ten-year forward rate, 
the hedge involves a long position in the five-year note (and a 
short position in the ten-year note) that must also be adjusted 
dynamically. Consequently, a rise in the five-to-ten-year 
forward rate will require a larger long position in the five-year 
note, which in turn will lead to additional purchases of the five-
year note. A large quantity of such purchases could place 
upward pressure on five-year note prices and thus exert 
downward pressure on five-year rates. Because of sizable 
transaction costs, we assume that such hedge adjustments are 
not instantaneous, but instead occur over a number of days. 
Below, we look for such effects at a weekly frequency.
Table 1
Estimated Volume of Hedging Activity Relative
to Daily Turnover in the Eurodollar Futures Market
Volume as a Percentage of Turnover
Maturity
For a 25-Basis-Point 
Rate Change
For a 75-Basis-Point 
Rate Change
Zero to one year 5 24
One to three years 29 93
Three to five years 201 591
Five to ten years 513 1510
Source: Kambhu (1998).56 The Effect of Interest Rate Options Hedging
The combination of these hedging transactions gives us the 
following testable hypothesis: a rise in the three-to-five-year 
forward rate will lead to a future rise in the five-year spot rate, 
and a rise in the five-to-ten-year forward rate will be followed 
by a fall in the five-year spot rate. We test for the presence of 




 is the five-year interest rate;
 is the three-to-five-year forward rate;
 is the five-to-ten-year forward rate;
 is the one-week change in the five-year 
interest rate;
 is the t-1-week change in 
the forward rate, lagged one week, where the subscripts 
denote the interval of the forward rate;
 is the t-1-week change in the 
five-year spot rate, lagged one week; and
 is an error-
correction term from the cointegration relationship in the 
levels of the five-year and forward rates, lagged one week.8
If hedging by options dealers has an impact on the five-year 
interest rate, as hypothesized above, the coefficients on the 
changes in forward rates will have the signs  and  .9
Were the 1990s Different
from Earlier Periods?
If the hedging of interest rate options affects intermediate-
maturity interest rates, then the behavior of these rates in the 
1990s should be different from their behavior in earlier decades. 
To look for this change, we begin with an analysis of Treasury 
interest rates. We then examine the relationship between spot 
rates and lagged forward rates during the 1990s using forward 
Eurodollar rates from the interest rate swap yield curve.
Despite the fact that the Eurodollar rate is the benchmark 
rate in the caps market and dealers may first look to the 
Eurodollar futures market to hedge their options exposures, 
two factors drive us to use Treasury rates initially. First, a 
sufficiently long sample period for the years before the 1990s 
is available only with Treasury interest rates, and second, 
arbitrage opportunities between Eurodollar rates and Treasury 
rates make the two interest rates very highly correlated. For the 
analysis using Treasury rates, we end the sample period at 1999. 
We end it there because new issuances of three-year Treasury 
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notes were discontinued in 1998, and because the relationship 
between long-term Treasury rates and other market rates 
appears to have changed in response to the Treasury buy-back 
program, which began in early 2000. (Our analysis using swaps 
rates, however, employs a data set that includes 2000.)
Results Using Forward Rates
from the Treasury Curve
To determine whether a change in the dynamics of interest 
rates occurred around 1990, we estimate regressions of 
equation 1 in sets of seven-year sample periods, rolling forward 
in one-year increments from 1965 to 1999. The data consist of 
weekly interest rates, with observations on the Wednesday of 
each week.10 Each regression estimates the relationship 
between changes in the spot five-year interest rate and past 
changes in the three-to-five-year forward rate and the five-to-
ten-year forward rate. We use two versions of these regressions, 
one with two-week changes in forward rates and the other with 
five-week changes in forward rates. (Additional details on data 
and estimations can be found in Appendix A.)
The estimation results are summarized in Charts 1 and 2. 
Chart 1 depicts the statistical significance of the relationship 
between the spot and lagged forward rates, while Chart 2 depicts 
the direction and size of the relationship. The charts show a 
distinct difference in the relationship before and after 1990.
Chart 1 measures the strength of the statistical relationship 
between the spot and lagged forward rates over the 1965-99 
period. It plots two lines: one for the effects of two-week 
changes in forward rates and the other for the effects of five-
week changes in forward rates. The first point on each line is 
from the first rolling regression (1965-71) and the last point is 
for the final regression (1993-99). The test statistic shown is an 
F-statistic for the joint distribution of the coefficients for the 
two forward rates,  and  . The F-statistic is nonstandard 
and is above the critical value only if both of the forward rates 
are statistically significant predictors of the change in the five-
year rate. (For more on the test, see Appendix A.)
β 1 β 2
If the hedging of interest rate options 
affects intermediate-maturity interest 
rates, then the behavior of these rates
in the 1990s should be different from
their behavior in earlier decades.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2001 57
Chart 1
F-Statistics for the Joint Distribution of the















Notes: The dependent variable is the Treasury rate; the explanatory
variables are forward rates from the Treasury curve. F-statistics are
from twenty-nine rolling regressions, each with seven-year sample
periods. The F-statistic is for the test H0: β 1  = 0 or  β 2  =0 ;  H1: β 1  ≠  0






Confidence Bands for the Coefficients β 1   and β 2
from 1965 to 1999
















Notes: The dependent variable is the Treasury rate; the explanatory
variables are forward rates from the Treasury curve. Depicted are
95 percent confidence bands (one-tailed) of the coefficients from
twenty-nine rolling regressions, each with seven-year sample periods.
Influence of ∆ F3,5 on ∆ r




Chart 1 shows that a statistically significant relationship 
between the spot rates and both forward rates appears only 
during the 1990s, and that the equations with five-week 
changes in forward rates are significant in the early 1990s while 
those with two-week changes in forward rates are significant in 
the latter part of the 1990s. These results suggest that changes 
in forward rates affect subsequent spot rates only during the 
1990s, and that the impact occurs faster in the latter part of the 
decade. Later, we explore further the speed and duration of the 
forward rates’ influence on the spot rate.
While Chart 1 summarizes only the statistical significance of 
the relationship between the spot and forward rates, Chart 2 
shows the size and direction of the relationship. That chart 
provides confidence bands for the coefficients in the 
regressions with the two-week change in forward rates. Both 
coefficients are significant simultaneously and have signs 
consistent with hedging-related liquidity effects only after 1992 
(a positive coefficient for   and a negative coefficient for 
).11 For the periods before 1992, the lagged three-to-
five-year forward rate occasionally has a significant positive 
effect on the five-year spot rate, but the change in the five-to-
ten-year forward rate is rarely significant, and then only with 
a positive coefficient rather than the postulated negative 
coefficient.12 Regressions using five-week changes in forward 
rates (not shown) produced similar results, with the notable 
exception being that both forward rates were significant 
only during the early 1990s. (The statistics from a set of 
representative regressions are provided in Appendix B.)
∆ F35 ,
∆ F51 0 ,
Although the lagged forward rates exert a statistically 
significant effect on the spot rate, they explain only a small part 
of the variation in the spot rate. This is evident from the small R2 
of the regression equations in Appendix B. The low explanatory 
power of our regressions is reflected in the fact that our 
regression results cannot be used to create profitable trading 
strategies in the presence of transaction costs. Our regression 
results suggest that the five-year Treasury yield can be predicted 
using information on past changes in forward rates. Thus, one 
might assume that there are unexploited profitable trading 
opportunities in the five-year-note market. In light of the depth 
and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury market, however, the existence 
of such unexploited profit opportunities would seem unlikely. 
Indeed, trading strategies based on our regression results were 
not consistently profitable.13 Other implications of this low 
explanatory power are examined later.58 The Effect of Interest Rate Options Hedging
Chart 3
Confidence Bands for the Coefficients β 1   and β 2
for Forward Rates from the Interest Rate 
Swap Curve from 1989 to 2000















1994-2000 1993-99 1992-98 1991-97 1990-96 1989-95
Notes: Depicted are 95 percent confidence bands (one-tailed) of the
coefficients from six rolling regressions, each with seven-year sample
periods. β 1  is the influence of ∆ F3,5 on ∆ r;  β 2  is the influence of
∆ F5,10 on ∆ r.
Dependent variable: Five-year Treasury rates









To explore further whether these results are related to 
market liquidity effects, we estimated regressions similar to 
those above using shorter maturity interest rates. We reasoned 
that the much larger turnover volume and greater liquidity of 
the shorter maturity fixed-income markets should easily 
accommodate options hedging activity with little effect on 
shorter maturity interest rates. Indeed, regressions of changes 
in the one-year spot rate on lagged changes in the six-month-
to-one-year forward rate and the one-to-two-year forward rate 
produced no evidence of positive feedback.14
Results with Forward Rates from the 
Interest Rate Swap Yield Curve
Because the predominant benchmark rate in the caps market is 
the Eurodollar rate, we would expect positive-feedback effects, 
if any, to appear first in the Eurodollar market. Thus, we repeat 
the analysis above using forward rates derived from the interest 
rate swap yield curve. The swaps data consist of one-week 
changes in rates from Wednesday to Wednesday, where the 
rates are the fixed rate in fixed-for-floating Eurodollar interest 
rate swaps. Because reliable data on rates of long-dated swaps 
are available only from the late 1980s, our sample begins in 
1989. As before, our analysis consists of a series of regressions, 
each with a seven-year sample period rolling forward in one-
year increments. (More information on our data and sources 
can be found in Appendix A.)
The results found using forward Eurodollar rates are the same 
as those found using the Treasury forward interest rates. The 
confidence bands for the estimated coefficients   and   for 
two-week changes in forward rates are presented in Chart 3. The 
top panel shows the effect on five-year Treasury rates and the 
bottom panel shows the effect on five-year swap rates, where the 
explanatory variables in both cases are forward Eurodollar rates 
from the swap curve. As before, the three-to-five-year forward 
rate has a positive coefficient and the five-to-ten-year forward 
rate has a negative coefficient. The two-week changes in forward 
rates are always statistically significant in the latter part of the 
decade. Similar results are obtained with the five-week changes 
in forward rates (not shown), except that statistically significant 
coefficients are found only in the earlier part of the decade.
Like the influence of Treasury forward rates, the influence of 
forward Eurodollar rates on the spot rate is also consistent with 
the predicted effect of the dynamic hedging of options.
The regression results in Appendix B provide additional 
details on our finding that changes in forward rates affect 
spot rates faster toward the end of the decade. Moreover, 
β 1 β 2
the impact also appears to have remained at least as strong. 
In fact, in all the representative regressions in Tables B1 and 
B2 of Appendix B, the estimated coefficients for the two-
week changes in forward rates in the second half of the 
decade are consistently larger than the coefficients for the 
five-week changes in forward rates in the first half of 
the decade.
One interpretation of the faster impact of changes in the 
forward rates toward the end of the 1990s is that options 
dealers adjusted their hedge positions faster at the end of the 
decade than they did at the beginning. This change in behavior 
could be due either to lower transaction costs or a recognition 
that delayed hedge adjustments, requiring larger transactions, 
can be costly and difficult to execute, because they strain 
market liquidity. Although the classic options pricing models 
assume continuous rebalancing of hedge positions, in practice FRBNY Economic Policy Review / December 2001 59
options dealers face a trade-off in the timing of their hedge 
adjustments. Faster or more frequent hedge adjustments 
produce hedge positions that more effectively match an 
option’s exposure to price risk, but they do so at the cost of 
higher cumulative transaction costs over the life of the option 
(see, for example, Toft [1996]). Thus, a change in the trade-off 
from lower transaction costs would lead to faster or more 
frequent hedge adjustments.
Only the Big Changes Matter
Facing transaction costs, dealers might choose to adjust their 
hedge positions only for changes in forward rates above a 
certain threshold. If this asymmetry in behavior is present, then 
regressions with subsamples of small and large changes in 
forward rates should produce different results. The samples for 
these regressions are constructed by partitioning the data into 
subsamples of roughly equal size, with smaller changes in 
forward rates in one subsample and larger changes in the 
other.15 The results of these regressions confirm the presence 
of the asymmetric behavior (Table 2). The feedback effects 
from forward rates to spot rates appear to be present only in 
large changes in forward rates. Further evidence that feedback 
effects are stronger when rate changes are large is presented in 
Table B3, where the effect is estimated for periods of large 
sustained changes in the five-year rate.
How Long Does It Last?
If our empirical results are due to hedging-related liquidity 
effects, we would expect them to be relatively short-lived. To 
examine the duration of the influence of forward rates on the 
spot rate, we estimate a series of regressions using changes in 
forward rates ranging from one to thirteen weeks. These 
regressions estimate the effect of changes in forward rates of up 
to thirteen weeks on the one-week change in the spot Treasury 
rate. (Appendix A provides further details of the estimation.) 
The results are summarized in Chart 4, which shows the 
strength of the statistical significance of the relationship 
between the spot and forward rates, and Chart 5, which depicts 
the direction and size of the relationship.
Chart 4 presents F-statistics measuring the statistical signifi-
cance of the changes in forward rates for changes ranging from 
one to thirteen weeks. Results are shown for regressions using 
both the five-year Treasury rate and the five-year swaps rate as 
the dependent variable. In both regressions, the explanatory 
variables are forward rates from the swap curve. The regressions 
are estimated separately for the periods 1990 to 1995 (top panel) 
Table 2












Adjusted R2 0.036 -0.001
Number of observations 276 298
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The sample period is 1990-2000. The dependent variable is the Treasury rate; the explanatory variables are forward rates from the swap curve.
An asterisk indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level and with the predicted sign. The term Z in each regression is estimated 
using the sample in Table B2: 1989-2000. The estimated cointegrating equation is Z = r5 - 0.032 - 7.698 F3,5 + 7.007 F5,10.
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Chart 4
F-Statistics for the Joint Distribution 
of the Coefficients β 1   and β 2  for Changes in













Critical value for F-statistic (5 percent)
tr on Fs
s on Fs
13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Notes: The explanatory variables are forward rates from the swap
curve: s on Fs is the regression of the spot swaps rate on forward rates
from the swap curve; tr on Fs is the regression of the spot Treasury
rate on forward rates from the swap curve. F-statistics are from
thirteen regressions, each with a change in forward rates over the
interval indicated on the horizontal axis—from one to thirteen weeks.
The F-statistic is for the test H0: β 1  = 0 or β 2 = 0 ; H1: β 1    ≠  0 and
β 2  ≠  0.
1990-95
1996-2000




Confidence Bands for the Coefficients β 1   and β 2
















13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Notes: The sample period is 1996-2000. β 1  is the influence of ∆ F3,5
on ∆ r;  β 2  is the influence of ∆ F5,10 on ∆ r. The dependent variable is
the spot Treasury rate; the explanatory variables are forward rates
from the swap curve. Depicted are 95 percent confidence bands
(one-tailed) from thirteen regressions, each with a change in forward
rates over the interval indicated on the horizontal axis—from one to
thirteen weeks. In the bottom panel, the regression sample is restricted
to those periods in which the subsequent two-month change in the
five-year Treasury rate lies within the largest 25 percent of rate changes.
Full sample









and 1996 to 2000 (bottom panel) to allow for differences 
between the beginning and end of the 1990s.16 The results 
suggest that the statistical significance of the influence of forward 
rates on the spot five-year rate weakens after six weeks. In 
addition, a comparison of the two panels further supports our 
finding that the influence of lagged forward rates on the spot rate 
occurs more quickly in the second half of the decade; moreover, 
the effect appears to dissipate faster.
Chart 5 gives the confidence bands for the coefficients   
and   for the regressions with spot Treasury rates as the 
dependent variable for the 1996-2000 period. The confidence 
bands are estimates of the size and direction of the influence of 
lagged changes in forward rates on the spot five-year rate. The 
chart shows that a two-week change in forward rates influences 
β 1
β 2
the Treasury spot rate in the predicted direction (a positive 
effect for   and a negative effect for  ). In the estimates 
using the full sample (top panel), the effect has weakened 
enough to no longer be statistically significant by about three 
weeks, and by nine weeks, the effect has disappeared. In a 
sample restricted to large rate changes (bottom panel), the 
feedback effects are larger and longer lasting, remaining 
statistically significant for as long as five to six weeks. As in the 
full sample, the effects disappear by about nine weeks.
The absence of a long-lasting influence of the forward rates 
on the five-year spot rate in these results suggests that we are 
observing market liquidity effects. In particular, the results are 
consistent with prices returning to prevailing levels after the 
market absorbs dealers’ hedging transactions.
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Do Liquidity Effects Spill Over from 
the Swap Curve to the Treasury Curve?
Having analyzed the length of the relationship between lagged 
forward rates and the spot interest rate, we can explore the 
direction of the influence on the relationship between the 
Treasury and swap yield curves. In the regressions above, we 
obtain similar statistical results regardless of whether we regress 
five-year Treasury rates on forward Treasury rates or forward 
swaps rates. Similarly, forward swaps rates predict similar 
liquidity effects on the five-year Treasury rate and the five-year 
swaps rate. However, if we use forward Treasury rates to predict 
swaps rates, the statistical results are not as strong. Forward 
Treasury rates influence the five-year swaps rate only in the early 
part of the 1990s. In the latter half of the decade, forward 
Treasury rates are not statistically significant predictors of the 
five-year swaps rate. Thus, in the latter part of the decade, it 
appears that the direction of “causality” for positive-feedback 
effects is from the swaps market to the Treasury market.
One interpretation of this result is that the growing liquidity 
of the swaps market and the wider use of more refined pricing 
models have shifted the focus of hedging decisions toward the 
swap curve. At the beginning of the 1990s, more dealers may 
have been using earlier generations of pricing and hedging 
models that did not differentiate strongly between swaps rates 
and Treasury rates at the longer maturities. Toward the end of 
the decade, however, more refined pricing models based on the 
swap yield curve became more widely used, causing lagged 
Treasury forward rates to lose their explanatory power.17
Implications for Risk Management 
and Policy
At first glance, the feedback effects highlighted above appear 
to be second-order. The small explanatory power of the 
regressions indicates that the postulated market liquidity effect 
of the hedging of interest rate options explains only a small 
portion of typical fluctuations in the yield curve. In addition, 
the magnitude of the feedback effect is normally not large. For 
example, during 1996-2000, only 20 to 25 percent of the change 
in lagged forward rates was transmitted to the five-year spot 
rate (Appendix B, Tables B1 and B2). During this period, the 
average weekly change (absolute value) in the five-year rate was 
about 9.5 basis points, only 2 basis points of which could be 
attributed to the combined changes in the two forward rates.
If our interpretation is correct, the small impact on the yield 
curve is reassuring, as it implies that options dealers’ liquidity 
risk arising from their need to adjust hedge positions should be 
manageable under normal circumstances. Nevertheless, the 
market disruptions in the fall of 1998 were a reminder that 
normally manageable liquidity risk can turn large in ways that 
surprise even experienced market participants.18 Many 
institutions that relied on market liquidity to execute dynamic 
risk management strategies found themselves exposed to far 
higher risks than they had anticipated. This heightened sense of 
risk, in turn, caused many participants to withdraw from 
markets, further impairing liquidity. Although the dynamic 
hedging strategies examined in this article were not particularly 
stressed during the fall of 1998 (because the benchmark interest 
rate environment remained comparatively benign), the 
suddenness of the 1998 liquidity crisis is a warning about any 
market’s vulnerability to dynamic risk management strategies.
The conclusion that liquidity risk is manageable under 
normal circumstances thus leaves room for questions about 
more extreme circumstances. In our empirical results, the 
feedback effects are stronger when interest rate changes are large 
(Table 2 and Chart 5). As a result, estimates based on the full 
sample may understate potential distortions to the yield curve 
during periods of large changes in interest rates. Indeed, during 
periods of large sustained changes in rates that continue for 
several weeks, the change in forward rates accounts for a 
relatively large proportion of the change in the five-year spot 
rate. For instance, if we examine periods during 1996-2000, 
when the five-year rate changed by more than 68 basis points 
over a two-month period (the largest 10 percent of such 
changes), more than 70 percent of the change in lagged forward 
rates was transmitted to the five-year spot rate (Table B3). 
Furthermore, changes in lagged forwards account for nearly half 
of the variation in the five-year spot rate during such periods. 
Finally, the feedback effect is also more persistent during 
periods of large rate changes, as we see in Chart 5.
Our finding of larger feedback effects during episodes of 
large changes in interest rates suggests that dealers’ hedging 
The times when market participants
and policymakers are most interested in 
extracting from the yield curve a signal 
about economic fundamentals are 
precisely the times when changes
in the curve may be distorted by
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demands might run up against more severe liquidity con-
straints if the volatility of rates were to rise sharply. Overall, the 
interest rate environment of the 1990s was relatively benign by 
historical standards. In a more volatile environment—such as 
the one experienced in the late 1970s and early 1980s—
dynamic hedging might introduce more disruptive positive-
feedback effects if reduced market liquidity and dealers’ 
hedging demands interacted to amplify market shocks.19
Furthermore, the potential for positive-feedback effects has 
implications for how short-run yield curve movements are 
interpreted by market participants and policymakers. In recent 
years, these movements have been followed closely for several 
reasons. For example, the yield curve has been shown by 
studies to be a relatively good predictor of economic activity, 
in part because it appears to reflect expectations of future 
economic fundamentals (see, for example, Estrella and 
Mishkin [1998], Estrella and Hardouvelis [1991], and Stock 
and Watson [1989]). In addition, the curve reflects one com-
ponent of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, 
from short-term to long-term interest rates.
If yield curve movements over short time periods are 
influenced by liquidity effects as well as by expectations of 
economic fundamentals and policy, these movements may have 
to be interpreted more carefully. Yield curve changes tend to be 
monitored most closely when large economic and financial 
shocks occur or when significant policy changes are made. 
However, our empirical results suggest that liquidity effects in 
the yield curve are largest when shocks to interest rates are large. 
Thus, the times when market participants and policymakers are 
most interested in extracting from the yield curve a signal about 
economic fundamentals are precisely the times when changes in 
the curve may be distorted by liquidity effects.
Conclusion
In this article, we have examined the influence of market 
liquidity and dynamic trading strategies on the short-run 
behavior of the yield curve. Motivating our analysis was the 
hypothesis that dynamic hedging by sellers of interest rate 
options could generate transaction flows that affect market 
liquidity and thus produce systematic patterns in interest rate 
movements. The growth of the over-the-counter interest rate 
options market to significant size in the late 1980s allowed us to 
identify potential changes in interest rate dynamics that 
followed the development of this market. Indeed, we found a 
distinct difference in the dynamics of the term structure before 
and after 1990 that is consistent with the predicted impact of 
dynamic hedging of interest rate options.
Previous research on the structure of the interest rate 
options market has found that the largest impact of dealers’ 
dynamic hedging on trading volume in the underlying fixed-
income markets likely occurs along the intermediate-maturity 
section of the yield curve. For this segment of the curve, the 
hedging of options exposures to the three-to-five-year forward 
rate and the five-to-ten-year forward rate could have an effect 
on the five-year spot interest rate. Beginning around 1990, we 
find that the five-year spot rate does tend to behave as predicted 
following changes in the forward rates. In contrast, the 
relationship between the spot rate and the forward rates does 
not appear in the data before the 1990s.
We interpret the observed behavior of five-year interest 
rates as the product of short-term liquidity effects. This 
conclusion is based on several findings. First, the predicted 
relationship between forward rates and spot rates does not 
persist beyond a few weeks, nor can it be profitably exploited in 
a systematic way. Both results suggest that short-term liquidity 
forces rather than economic fundamentals are likely to be 
driving the results. In addition, and in contrast to the behavior 
of medium-maturity rates, shorter maturity interest rates show 
no evidence of such feedback effects. The ample liquidity of the 
markets for short-term interest rate products, where market 
turnover is large relative to hedging demands, makes them an 
unlikely site for any evidence of positive-feedback effects. 
Finally, forward rates predict spot rates in the medium-term 
segment of the yield curve only in the weeks when rate changes 
are relatively large. This finding is also consistent with liquidity 
effects, since large interest rate changes cause large adjustments 
to options hedges, which in turn induce trading flows that will 
be large relative to normal market turnover.
Although we find evidence of market liquidity effects 
consistent with dynamic hedging at the medium-term segment 
of the yield curve, the relationship accounts for only a small 
part of the variation in rates. The relatively small impact on the 
yield curve suggests that the U.S. dollar fixed-income markets 
are liquid and deep enough to absorb dealers’ hedging 
transactions under normal market conditions, and that the 
liquidity risk arising from their need to adjust hedge positions 
dynamically should be manageable. However, during periods 
when interest rates are changing rapidly or periods of market 
stress when interest rate volatility jumps, liquidity effects could 
be significantly larger. It is exactly during such times that short-
term yield curve movements may be most affected by hedge-
related trading and may move in ways that are unrelated to 
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Data
Our analysis uses weekly changes in interest rates; we do not use 
daily data because transaction costs can make it uneconomical to 
adjust options hedges completely on a daily basis. Our choice of 
interest rate data is based on two criteria. First, we wish to use 
market rates that reflect as closely as possible the actual trans-
action prices at which options dealers are trading. Second, to 
evaluate whether interest rate dynamics have changed over time, 
we choose data that had a relatively long history.
For Treasury securities, these two criteria lead us to use 
constant-maturity Treasury rates. These rates are nearly 
identical to on-the-run Treasury yields (with an adjustment to 
maintain a fixed maturity), and they are available on a daily 
basis going back more than thirty years. As a check, we also 
performed our analysis using on-the-run interest rate data 
from dealer quotes reported by Bloomberg. The results were 
the same as those using the constant-maturity data. We elected 
not to use estimated zero-coupon yields, such as those in 
McCulloch and Kwon (1993), because such yields are based on 
imputed prices, not transaction prices, and because they are 
calculated from less liquid, off-the-run Treasury securities, 
which are unlikely hedging vehicles for options dealers.
For forward Eurodollar rates, we use forward rates derived 
from the interest rate swap yield curve. Swaps rates are the fixed 
rate in fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps, where the floating 
rate is indexed to a short-term Eurodollar interest rate (often a 
three-month rate). This index and the wide use of the swaps 
market for trading and hedging make the swap yield curve a 
reasonable source for forward Eurodollar rates. The rates are 
Reuters quotes, obtained from DRI-WEFA.
To check for day-of-week and overlapping-day effects, we 
also estimated equation 1 using Tuesday to (prior) Wednesday 
changes in rates. This alternative model specification had no 
effect on our results.
Estimation
Consistent with previous research, we find that the levels of 
interest rates along the yield curve are cointegrated. In other 
words, interest rates are generally nonstationary integrated 
time series, but there exists a linear combination of these rates 
that is stationary. As noted by Engle and Granger (1987), 
time-series regressions involving relationships between the 
changes in cointegrated variables should include a lagged 
cointegration term in order to control for correlation between 
the contemporaneous levels of the regression variables that 
would otherwise interfere with consistent estimation of the 
equation coefficients. Using standard regression techniques, 
we estimated a cointegrating relationship between the five-year 
Treasury rate and the three-to-five-year and five-to-ten-year 
forward rates. This relationship produced the error-correction 
term Z in equation 1. The cointegrating relationship was 
estimated with a constant term, but without a time trend, while 
controlling for thirteen lags of changes in rates.
In equation 1, the lagged changes in the five-year spot rate 
were never statistically significant in any estimation of the 
equation. This result suggests that the lagged changes in the 
five-year rate affect changes in the current five-year rate only 
through the lagged changes in the forward rates. (By definition, 
changes in the three-to-five-year and the five-to-ten-year 
forward rates are affected by changes in the five-year spot rate 
in the same observation period.) Consequently, all of our 
charts and tables report regression results without the lagged 
change in the five-year rate.
Rolling Regressions
The first set of estimates, in Charts 1 and 2, consists of twenty-
nine regressions, each over seven-year sample periods rolling 
forward in one-year increments from 1965 to 1999. We use two 
versions of equation 1, corresponding to two- and five-week 





The estimation is least squares and the residuals terms are 
well behaved. The estimation was performed both with and 
without Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
(HAC) consistent covariance estimates, with similar results 
produced in both cases. Charts 1-3 show the results without the 
Newey-West covariance estimates. The error-correction term 
Z in each regression is estimated using a sample that begins and 
ends three years before and after the regression sample (except 
at the end points of the full sample).
∆ r5 c α Z 1 – () β 1∆ F35 , 1 – 3 – , () ++ =
β 2∆ F51 0 , 1 – 3 – , () ε ++
∆ r5 c α Z 1 – () β 1∆ F35 , 1 – 6 – , () ++ =
β 2∆ F51 0 , 1 – 6 – , () ε ++
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The regressions with forward rates from the swap curve 
(Charts 3-5 and Table 2) have similar structures. In these 
regressions, the error-correction term is estimated using the 
full sample of swaps data (1989-2000).
F-Statistics
The test for statistical significance, the results of which appear 
in Chart 1, is a nonstandard F-test of the joint distribution of 
the coefficients   and  ,
H0: or 
H1:   and .
In geometric terms, the test asks whether the ninety-fifth 
percentile confidence ellipse of the estimated coefficients 
(centered on the estimated values of   and  ) intersects 
either of the axes   or  . If it does not, both 
estimated coefficients are nonzero at a 95 percent confidence 
level (5 percent critical value).20
To perform the test, rather than finding all values of   and 
 on the confidence ellipse (that is, all combinations of   
and   for the 5 percent critical value of the F-statistic) and 
seeing whether these are in the interior of the parameter space, 
we construct F-statistics for the estimated coefficients along the 
axes for   and   and ask whether the F-statistics exceed the 
5 percent critical value. If they do, the ninety-fifth percentile 
confidence ellipse must be in the interior of the parameter 
space. Specifically, we calculate F-statistics for the joint 
distribution of the estimated coefficients   and   along the 
axis   and the axis  , with the distribution 
centered on the estimated values of   and  . The F-statistic 
chosen for the test is the smallest of these F-statistics, and the 
null hypothesis is rejected when this minimum value exceeds 
the critical value. This F-statistic is presented in Chart 1.
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The Duration of the Relationship between
the Spot Rate and Lagged Forward Rates
To determine the duration of the influence of the forward rates 
on the spot rate, we estimate the equation
(A3)
for  , giving us a set of thirteen regressions of the 
effect of changes in forward rates ranging from a one-week 
change to a thirteen-week change. As in the earlier case,   is 
the one-week change in the spot Treasury rate and Z(.) is the 
error-correction term from the cointegration relationship in 
the level of rates, and is estimated as described above. The test 
for statistical significance of the relationship between the spot 
and forward rates uses the same test procedure described 
earlier. The F-statistics for the joint distribution of   and   
are shown in Chart 4; confidence bands for the   and   
estimates are presented in Chart 5. The test statistics in these 
charts were computed with Newey-West HAC consistent 
covariances because of heteroskedastic residuals in the shorter 
sample periods, particularly 1996-2000.
∆ r5 c α Z 1 – () β 1∆ F35 , 1 – t – , () ++ =
β 2∆ F51 0 , 1 – t – , () ε ++
t 23… 14 ,, , =
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Results Using Treasury
Interest Rates
The statistics for a set of regressions illustrating the differences 
between the early and later parts of the 1990s are presented in 
Table B1. These regressions are performed for two subperiods: 
the six-year period from 1990 to 1995 and the four-year period 
from 1996 to 1999. Two regressions are estimated in each 
subperiod, one with two-week changes in forward rates 
(equation A1) and the other with five-week changes in forward 
rates (equation A2).
The statistics in Table B1 show that for the early 1990s, only 
the five-week changes in forward rates (equation A2) are 
statistically significant with the anticipated signs (a positive 
sign for changes in the three-to-five-year forward rate and a 
negative sign for changes in the five-to-ten-year forward rate). 
For the late 1990s, only the two-week changes (equation A1) 
are statistically significant with the anticipated signs. These 
findings, plus the absence of significant results for the other 
regressions, are consistent with Charts 1 and 2: lagged changes 
in forward rates affect five-year yields more quickly in the later 
part of the 1990s than in the earlier years of the decade. In the 
earlier period, only the regression with the five-week change in 
forward rates has significant coefficients, while in the later 
period, only the regression with the two-week change in 
forward rates has significant coefficients.
Results Using Forward Rates
from the Swap Curve
Illustrative regression statistics from equations using swaps 
interest rates are shown in Table B2. The explanatory variables 
in the regressions are forward rates derived from the swap yield 
curve, while the dependent variable is the spot Treasury rate in 
Appendix B: Representative Regression Results
Table B1













in Forward Rates 
Z(-1) 0.009 0.017 0.019 0.023









R2 0.006 0.034 0.032 0.027
Adjusted R2 -0.003 0.025 0.017 0.022
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: An asterisk indicates that the coefficient of the change in forward rates is significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed) and with the predicted sign. 
Equations A1 and A2 for 1990-95 are estimated using least squares and Newey-West HAC consistent covariance, while an EGARCH(2,2) correction was used 
in the estimation of equations A1 and A2 for 1996-99. The term Z in each regression is estimated using the sample in Table B2: 1989-2000. The estimated 
cointegrating equation is Z = r5 - 0.006 - 6.566 F3,5 + 5.57 F5,10.
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Table B2














Panel A: Regression of Spot Treasury Rate on Forward Eurodollar Rates
Z(-1) 0.002 0.006 0.033 0.032









R2 0.012 0.029 0.041 0.033
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.019 0.029 0.022
Panel B: Regression of Spot Swaps Rate on Forward Eurodollar Rates
Z(-1) 0.014 0.020 0.079 0.076









R2 0.011 0.021 0.031 0.023
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.012 0.020 0.011
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: An asterisk indicates that the coefficient of the change in forward rates is significant at the 5 percent level (two-tailed) and with the predicted sign. 
Equations are estimated using least squares with Newey-West HAC consistent covariance. The cointegration term Z in each regression is estimated using the 
full sample of swaps data: 1989-2000. The estimated cointegrating equations are Z = r5 - 0.032 - 7.698 F3,5 + 7.007 F5,10  for panel A, and Z = r5 - 0.019 - 
4.575 F3,5 + 3.764 F5,10  for panel B.
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panel A and the spot swaps rate in panel B. The results in these 
panels are similar to those arrived at using forward rates from 
the Treasury curve. As noted, changes in forward rates affect 
five-year yields more quickly toward the end of the 1990s.
Results for Periods of Large Changes 
in the Five-Year Treasury Rate
The regressions in Table B3 estimate the relationship between 
the spot five-year rate and lagged forward rates in periods 
leading up to episodes of large changes in the five-year rate. 
The regression sample is restricted to periods in which the 
subsequent two-month change in the five-year rate lies within 
the largest 10 percent of rate changes. In these regressions, the 
changes in forward rates have a substantially stronger influence 
on the spot five-year rate than they do in the full-sample 
regressions in Tables B1 and B2. For instance, during 1996-
2000, the predicted one-week change in the spot five-year rate 
is more than 70 percent of the two-week change in forward 
rates—compared with only 20 percent in the full sample. In 
addition, during this period, the R2 of the regression indicates 
that almost half of the variability in the spot five-year rate can 
be attributed to the change in forward rates.
Table B3
Regressions for Periods of Large Changes













Adjusted R2 0.22 0.32
Average value of dependent
  variable (basis points)
Predicted 8 7
Actual 13 10
Number of observations 57 25
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The sample is the largest 10 percent of two-month changes in the 
Treasury rate in the indicated period. In the regression equation 
, all 
terms are as defined in equation 1. The regression sample is defined by 
 basis points for 1990-2000 and 
 basis points for 1996-2000, where 
 is the leading two-month change in the spot five-year 
Treasury rate. All equations are estimated using least squares and Newey-
West HAC consistent covariance. The explanatory variables are forward 
rates derived from the swap yield curve. The term Z in each regression is 
estimated using the sample in Table B2: 1989-2000. The estimated 
cointegrating equation is Z = r5 - 0.032 - 7.698 F3,5 + 7.007 F5,10.
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1. The yield curve depicts interest rates of different maturities at a 
point in time. For more on the yield curve’s role as a predictor of 
economic activity, see, for example, Estrella and Mishkin (1998), 
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), and Stock and Watson (1989).
2. In the presence of liquidity risk, traders have a choice when making 
a large trade: they can either accept a disadvantageous price in return 
for immediate trade execution, or they can spread the trade over a 
series of smaller transactions and sacrifice immediacy of execution 
while bearing exposure to price risk until all transactions are 
completed.
3. An exception is Kodres (1994).
4. Figures are from International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
survey data.
5. See Kambhu (1998).
6. A 25-basis-point change in forward rates is slightly less than the 
largest daily change and represents approximately the ninetieth 
percentile of one-week changes in forward rates during the 1990s.
7. Other dynamic trading activity also has the potential to affect 
market liquidity in the fixed-income markets. For example, the 
hedging of mortgage-backed securities involves the dynamic 
adjustment of hedge positions as mortgage prepayment rates change 
in response to interest rate changes. Adjustments of mortgage-backed-
securities hedges may have influenced the shape of the yield curve 
following the Federal Reserve’s interest rate hikes in 1994 (Fernald, 
Keane, and Mosser 1994).
8. Equation 1 can be interpreted as an error-correction model for the 
five-year spot rate as a function of the lagged forward rates and the 
lagged five-year rate. Because the forward rates are functions of the 
three-, five-, and ten-year spot rates, the equation could be rewritten 
as an error-correction model of the five-year rate as a function of 
lagged three-, five-, and ten-year rates. To focus on the possible 
feedback effects of options trading, we chose to write the model in 
terms of forward rates. The coefficients a, b, and c in the cointegration 
term are estimated separately. See Appendix A for more details.
9. Our regression is different from that usually used for testing the 
expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. In the 
usual expectations-hypothesis framework, one-week changes in the 
five-year yield would be written as a function of the lagged slope of the 
term structure (from one week to five years) plus an (unforecastable) 
error term representing the one-week excess return on the five-year 
note (see Campbell [1995]). The lagged changes in rates should not be 
significant. Although our regressions are not directly comparable to 
the traditional expectations-hypothesis framework, we find that 
lagged changes in forward rates do affect changes in the five-year rate 
during the 1990s. Moreover, if we augment our regression by adding 
the lagged spread between the five-year rate and a one-week (LIBOR) 
rate, we still find that lagged forward rates predict the weekly change 
in the five-year yield during the 1990s.
10. The data are constant-maturity Treasury (CMT) yields. Forward 
rates are derived from the CMT rates. See Appendix A for details.
11. Although the two forward rates are correlated, their collinearity 
does not seem to account for the relationship depicted in these charts. 
The correlation between the forward rates in the same sample periods 
as the regressions in Charts 1 and 2 bears no relationship to the results 
in those charts. The periods during the 1980s in which the degree of 
correlation was the same as in the 1990s did not have the same 
regression results as in the latter period.
12. Indeed, during the 1980s, there is evidence of mild negative 
feedback (a negative coefficient for   and a positive coefficient 
for  ) from the forward rates to the five-year spot rate, although 
it is not statistically significant.
13. The trades consisted of either a long or short position in the five-
year Treasury note, depending on the signal from the forward rates, 
and an offsetting duration-matched position in the two- and ten-year 
Treasury securities. This “butterfly” trade created a position with 
exposure to the five-year spot rate but without exposure to changes in 
the level of the yield curve (see Garbade [1996, Chapter 14] for more 
on butterfly trades and the yield curve). Profits were calculated net of 
the transaction cost of 0.75 basis point per trade. Several strategies 
were tested, each of which required a different level of the signal from 
the forward rates before a trade was undertaken. Of those tested, the 
best performing strategy was profitable only at the very end of the 
1990s.
14. The data used were Treasury bill rates for the six-month and one-
year rates and constant-maturity rates for the two-year Treasury note. 
We found some evidence in the late 1980s that lagged forwards had 
predictive power for the one-year-note rate, but the relationship 
proved to be the opposite of what would be expected from the 
liquidity effects of hedging activity.
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15. The partition was achieved by increasing a cutoff value for the 
change in both forward rates in 1-basis-point increments until the 
subsample of changes in forward rates that exceeds the cutoff value 
was smaller than the other subsample.
16. Although the regression samples for the early and later parts of the 
1990s are split at the middle of the decade (1995 and 1996), similar 
results are still found with other partitions. In other words, our results 
are robust with respect to how the decade is split into early and later 
periods.
17. At the very end of the decade, reductions in the supply of Treasury 
securities along with the Treasury buy-back program probably 
exacerbated this trend.
18. See Bank for International Settlements (1999b) and Fleming 
(2000) for measures of the degree of illiquidity in what were normally 
liquid markets.
19. This possibility, however, does not imply that restrictions on 
dynamic hedging or option-like products are warranted. Indeed, 
restrictions would be undesirable for two reasons. First, dynamic 
hedging is not disruptive under normal market conditions. Second, 
restrictions on financial products whose risks are managed 
dynamically would limit the use of financial innovations that provide 
benefits to a wide range of economic agents, from residential mortgage 
borrowers to institutional investors. A more appropriate policy and 
risk management response would be prudent risk-based capital levels 
and robust liquidity management.
20. See Dhrymes (1978, pp. 80-3) for further discussion.References
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